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1 Introduction
One important characteristic of each credit line granted by the IMF during liquidity crises is
the degree and the form of conditionality imposed on the borrower. For instance, Stand-by
Arrangements require the debtor country to fulll some pre-established conditions before re-
sources are loaned. In contrast, a Flexible Credit Line do not require ex-post conditionalities,
which means resources are promptly available for a country in a liquidity crises, but this fa-
cility is only accessible to countries that match some ex-ante requirements. A Precautionary
and Liquidity Line is an example of an IMF facility that combines both ex-ante and ex-post
requirements.1
The IMF is subject to heated debates, and so are IMF conditionalities (see, e.g. Collier et al
(1997), Bird (2007) and Dreher (2009)). Among the several rationales for conditionalities pro-
posed by the literature, moral hazard is an often mentioned justication and a prominent issue
in the debate both in academic circles and in the popular press. In particular, it is often pointed
out that IMF bailouts might a¤ect incentives for debtors to carry out the necessary structural
adjustments. Conditionalities would then ensure that appropriate policies are undertaken in
order to make debt repayment more likely, if not certain.
The contribution of this paper to the debate is a model to study how conditional lending
and immediate liquidity provision a¤ect incentives for scal adjustment. On the one hand,
conditional lending might increase incentives for debtors to undertake costly measures required
for debt repayment by imposing those measures as a requirement for a country to receive
IMF liquidity support. On the other hand, (ex-post) conditionalities imply that resources are
only granted to the country after some time lag during which the country has to fulll the
requirements, and this delay in providing liquidity can be costly. This paper captures this
trade-o¤ in a simple model where liquidity needs and economic fundamentals are exogenous.
The model is employed to understand how IMF lending and conditionalities a¤ect the scal
stance of a government facing a liquidity crisis.
The model portraits a small open economy that had borrowed from abroad and faces a
sudden stop (as in Calvo (1998)), which means it temporarily loses access to private capital
ows. Projects that would need to be re-nanced have to be terminated, leading to output
1A description of all types of credit lines granted by the IMF can be found at www.imf.org.
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losses. Owing to the fall in output, generating revenues for debt repayment would require a large
tax rate, which might imply very low private consumption. However, the losses from liquidation
of long term projects can be reduced if an international lender of last resort (the IMF) steps
in and provides liquidity for the domestic economy. Lending can occur right after the liquidity
crisis is observed or after a time lag which allows for conditional lending. Conditionalities are
imposed in order to guarantee scal adjustment (as in Goncalves and Guimaraes, 2013). The
international lender of last resort has to ensure its loans will be fully repaid.
Conditional loans raise incentives for scal measures that improve the countrys capacity of
paying its sovereign debt because loans are only granted if the country carries out the stipulated
scal adjustment. However, immediate liquidity provision is more e¤ective in reducing ine¢ -
cient liquiditation costs. As a result, for some parameter values, immediate liquidity provision
provides more incentives for debt repayment than conditional lending. That happens when the
output losses resulting from a liquidity crisis are large, so that repaying debt would require
low private consumption for the domestic agents. In those situations, paradoxically, immedi-
ate liquidity provision can provide more incentives for scal adjustment than conditional IMF
lending, owing to the timing of assistance.
The results resonate with previous work that found an ambiguous e¤ect of IMF support on
incentives for reforms, implying that IMF lending does note necessarily generate moral hazard.
In the models of Corsetti et al (2006) and Morris and Shin (2006), liquidity support might
actually incentivize a country to undertake costly reforms. However, the mechanism and impli-
cations here are di¤erent. Since conditional lending requires some time for its implementation,
we show that it can actually be worse than unconditional lending in providing incentives for
scal adjustment.
One implication of the model is that the incentive for undertaking ascal adjustment required
for debt repayment is concave in the fraction of lending provided under conditionality. Hence
there are cases when it is optimal for the IMF to provide a facility with both immediate
and conditional resources. Intuitively, the marginal benets of avoiding liquidation costs are
decreasing. Preventing a sharp output fall might be necessary for keeping the repayment
option viable, but the incentives for adjustment provided by conditional lending are more
important when the marginal utility of consumption is not so severely a¤ected by the liquidation
costs. While it remains possible that the best choice is to o¤er just conditional facilities or
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just immediate assistance, one implication of the model is that an international lender of last
resort might also search for a balance between immediate liquidity support and conditional
lending. Hence the model is consistent with the often observed mix between immediate liquidity
support and ex-post conditionalities. The Fund often lends resources to countries in distress
when a liquidity crisis hits, but also provides further loan instalments later as long as some
conditionalities are met.
The model is then extended to a case where tight scal policy is costly to the economy.
The objective is to understand how the cost of tight scal policy a¤ects the optimal level of
conditionalities. Interestingly, a larger cost of scal adjustment shifts the balance towards
immediate liquidity support. When the cost of adjusting is large, repaying debt implies a large
marginal utility of consumption, and immediate liquidity support is the best way to deal with
the problem. A large cost of scal policy might also make debt repayment a dominated option
even with support from the IMF, but then an increase in the level of conditionalities cannot
solve this problem.
The model is related to the vast literature on sovereign default. Much of the research in this
eld builds on the seminal contribution of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). A small open economy
can borrow from abroad but cannot commit to repay its debt and default occurs when defaulting
is the optimal choice. Most of this literature abstracts from scal policy.2 An important feature
of this literature is that foreign credit is always available as long as the domestic economy is
willing to compensate lenders for the risk of defaulting.3 This paper takes the opposite extreme
view and considers a situation of a sudden stop, where private foreign credit is not available.
The model is thus suitable to study an economy going through a liquidity crisis that could be
solvent if it had access to (actuarially-fair priced) private funding.
There is also a game-theoretical literature studying the strategic interactions between the
IMF and private creditors. Examples include Rochet and Vives (2004), Corsetti et al (2006)
and Morris and Shin (2006). This paper takes the liquidity needs of the country as given, thus
abstracting from the possible e¤ects of the IMF on private lenders. That allows for a simple
model focused on the trade-o¤ between immediate liquidity provision and conditional support,
2Exceptions include Cuadra et al (2010), who study cyclicality of scal policy in this framework, and Goncalves and
Guimaraes (2013), who shows that scal policy is time inconsistent in this environment.
3 In most of the literature, creditors are risk neutral, so the domestic economy can always borrow at the actuarially
fair price. Lizarazo (2013) considers the case with risk averse lenders, which generates a risk premium in the model.
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which is the contribution of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section describes the model and section 3 presents
the results. Section 4 shows numerical examples that illustrate the workings of the model.
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the ndings of the paper in the context of the literature
on the IMF and the debate on conditionalities.
2 Model
A small open economy that had borrowed from abroad faces a liquidity crisis. Projects that
would need to be re-nanced have to be terminated, leading to output losses, unless the IMF
lends resources to the domestic economy. Those output losses a¤ect choices on scal policy and
debt repayment, so the IMF intervention might avert a sovereign default episode.
2.1 The small open economy
A small open economy has debt D. The representative agent has utility given by:
U = u(c) + g   P
where c is consumption, u is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function (u0 > 0, u00 < 0),
g is government spending, and P is the penalty associated with default. Linearity in g is
assumed for simplicity. Let Z  D be the debt repayment. If the country pays all its debt
(Z = D), the penalty P is equal to 0. Otherwise, in case of total or partial default (Z < D), the
country faces a penalty P =  . The penalty   represents the costs associated with sovereign
default. There is a large literature on the costs of sovereign default, and while there is no
consensus on the importance of each particular channel, it is widely accepted that sovereign
default entails costs to the domestic country. Our model captures this cost is a simple way.4
Government spending is nanced by a tax  on the output y. The budget constraints for
4See Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2009) for a survey of this literature. The costs of sovereign default might
stem from a reduction in international trade, perhaps owing to trade sanctions (see, e.g., Rose (2005) and Martinez and
Sandleris (2011); reputational costs that a¤ect access to nance or the countrys position when negotiating with other
nations (see, e.g., Tomz (2007) and Fuentes and Saravia (2010); domestic problems caused by the redistribution of wealth
resulting from the sovereign default (see, e.g., Broner and Ventura (2011); among others.
5
consumers and for the government imply that:
c = (1  )y
g = y   Z
For simplicity, taxes are not distortionary.5 Debt must be repayed out of the government
account.6 Naturally, g and c have to be non-negative, and in case the government pays its debt
in full, the constraint g  0 can be written as:
y  D  0 (1)
In order to make the problem interesting, it is assumed that D   . In case D >  , the
domestic economy would never repay its debt: by not repaying debt the government faces cost
  instead of D and do not face the constraint in (1), so default is certainly better if D >  .
Owing to the constraint, default might still be optimal in the case D   .
Timing is as follows:
 The domestic economy starts with debt D and investment I.
 In period 1, there are liquidity needs equal to `1. Let x1 be the amount reinvested to cover
liquidity needs, so x1  `1. Then `1 x1 units of the investment are liquidated in the rst
period.7
 Interim output is given by ' = R(I   (`1  x1)), where R > 1 is the return to investment.
 The government chooses the tax rate  , which is observable.
 In period 2, there are further liquidity needs equal to `2. Let x2 be the amount reinvested
to cover liquidity needs, so x2  `2. Then `2 x2 units of the interim output are liquidated
in the period 2.
 Output y is given by y = R('  (`2   x2)).
 The country decides on debt repayment Z and payo¤s are realized.
5Section 3.3 considers the case where taxes have a negative e¤ect on output.
6That is as in Cuadra et al. (2010) and Gonçalves and Guimaraes (2013).
7Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) model liquidity needs in a similar way.
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The initial debt D and investment I, the return R, the penalty   and the liquidity needs
`1 and `2 are exogenous in the model. They represent the economic outlook of the country.
An economy might be illiquid but solvent, in the sense that its debt would be easily paid if
it could borrow at actuarially fair rates to cover for its liquidity needs, but high values of `1
and `2 might make it very costly to repay its debt in the absence of foreign credit. The model
focuses on a situation of a sudden stop (as in Calvo (1998)) where the domestic economy
cannot access private credit.
The key endogenous variables are the tax rate  and debt repayment Z, chosen by the
government, and IMF lending that will be used to cover liquidity needs, x1 and x2. There are
two key distinction between periods 1 and 2: liquidation of projects in period 1 is more costly,
representing the idea that immediate liquidity support can avert severe output slumps at times
of crisis, but period 2 occurs after the scal decision has been undertaken, so lending in period
2 can be conditional on a certain  .
Interest rate is normalized to 0.
Since the country cannot access external nance, without IMF lending, x1 = x2 = 0. Output
of the economy is then given by
y0 = IR
2   `1R2   `2R
By assuming a sudden stop, the model does not explain why capital ows suddenly dry and
basically assumes a role for the IMF. The model is then used to analyse the trade-o¤ between
conditionalities and immediate liquidity support faced by this international lender of last resort.
2.2 The IMF
There is an international lender of last resort, the IMF, endowed with an amount A of resources
that can be lent to be country. Its preferences are simple: as in Rochet and Vives (2004) and
Corsetti et al (2006), the IMF gets benet B if it succeeds in avoiding a liquidity crisis (perhaps
because the IMF internalizes the externalities on other countries) but faces a cost C if the
country default on its debt (net of any benet).
The IMF can lend to the domestic country in both periods, but the total amount lent cannot
exceed A. Let a  A be the total amount lent and let  be the proportion lent in the rst
period. The trade-o¤ between conditionality and immediate liquidity support is captured by
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the value , the key endogenous variable in the IMF problem. A value of  close to one means
the country will receive much of its liquidity support before being inspected by the IMF.
Lending in the second period can be made contingent to conditionalities, in particular, to a tax
rate  chosen by the IMF. A value of  close to 0 implies most of IMF lending is conditional to
a tax rate  .
In order to allow  to vary between 0 and 1, we assume A  `1 and A  `2. Then
x1 = a and x2 = (1   )a. Output y now depends on whether the country complies with
the conditionalities imposed by the Fund. In case the domestic government choose its tax rate
equal to  , its output y is given by
yh = IR
2   [`1   a]R2   [`2   (1  ) a]R
However, if the domestic government chooses a di¤erent tax rate, it does not receive an instal-
ment from the IMF in period 2, and output y is then given by
yl = IR
2   [`1   a]R2   `2R
A large  implies the country will face a smaller output loss (since a is multiplied by R2 and
(1 )a is multiplied by R). That captures the benets of prompt liquidity support. However,
a large  also imply a small di¤erence between yh and yl, which will play an important role in
the model.
The model captures the role of IMF lending stated in Article I of the Funds Articles of
Agreement: to give condence to members by making the general resources of the Fund tem-
porarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to
correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive
of national or international prosperity.The liquidation costs capture the destructive measures
mentioned in the statement.
3 Equilibrium
We rst discuss the choice of the domestic economy with respect to scal adjustment  and
debt payment Z in a situation without the IMF. We then include the IMF in the model, analyze
how government policy and IMF lending interact and study the optimal value of .
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The assumptions on default cost immediately imply that either debt is fully repaid (Z = D)
or is not at all repaid (Z = 0). So the problem of the domestic economy is reduced to a binary
choice (default or not) and the choice of  .
3.1 Benchmark case with no IMF
The rst order condition with respect to  yields
u0 ([1  ^ ] y0) = 1
where ^ is the optimal tax rate if there are no binding restrictions to the choice of  . The
marginal utility of consuming one extra unit equals the marginal benet of public spending
(equal to 1 in the model). However, the constraint g  0 in (1) will be binding if ^ y0 < D and
the government wants to repay its debt, since in this case the domestic government will not
have enough resources to honor its obligations with a tax rate equal to ^ .
There are then two cases to consider: suppose rst the constraint g  0 does not bind. Then
utility in case of repayment and default are given by
UP0 = u([1  ^ ] y0) + ^ y0  D
UD0 = u([1  ^ ] y0) + ^ y0     (2)
where UP0 is utility in case of repayment and UD0 is utility in case of default. Owing to the
assumption D   , the country chooses to repay its debt.8
Now suppose the constraint g  0 binds if the country decides to repay its debt. In case of
default, the utility of the representative agent is still given by (2), since in that case g = ^ y0 > 0.
In case of repayment, the constraint in (1) implies   D=y0, and owing to the concavity in
u, that is the tax rate the government would choose (in case of repayment). Utility in case of
repayment is now given by
UP0 = u(y0  D)
Hence the government chooses to repay its debt if:9
u(y0  D)  u([1  ^ ] y0)  ^ y0 +    0
8 If D happened to be larger than  , the government would choose to default and there is nothing the IMF could do
about it. This is a case where it is never optimal to repay the contracted amount of debt.
9 It is easy to show that if this condition holds, repayment is better than defaulting under the assumption    D.
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In case the constraint g  0 is slack, that is, if debt repayment does not require some
extra scal adjustment, repaying the debt entails a benet given by the di¤erence   D. This
benet is also present in case the constraint g  0 binds, but now there is also a cost: the tax
rate will have to be larger than the government would like, which reduces the marginal utility
of consumption. In this case, repaying debt entails some scal adjustment which hurts the
consumer in the present period. The result is then ambiguous. The cost of scal adjustment
(very low consumption) might make default the optimal choice for the domestic government.
IMF lending can a¤ect that decision.
3.2 Optimal IMF lending
The preferences of the IMF imply it will lend to the domestic country if and only if it expects to
be fully repaid. That puts an endogenous limit to a since debt will never be repaid if a+D >  .
Hence a      D and it will be shown that as long as this condition is satised, incentives
for repayment are increasing in a. Hence the IMF can avoid default if and only if the country
chooses to repay its debt when a = maxfA;  Dg.
Now the constraint g  0 in (1) becomes
  a+D
y
If this constraint does not bind, the rst order condition with respect to  yields
u0 ([1  ^P ] yh) = 1
and as long as a      D, the country nds it optimal to repay the intuition this case is
identical to the one in the previous section.
Now suppose the constraint g  0 binds. In this case, the domestic government chooses
between scal adjustment and repayment. Repayment requires y = a+D but output is given
by yh, so
UPI = u(yh   a D)
Alternalively, the domestic government can choose the tax rate that maximizes utility consid-
ering debt will not be repayed, taking into account that it will not receive the IMF loan in the
second period, so output will be given by yl. Thus
UDI = u([1  ^D] yl) + ^Dyl    
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where ^D is given by
u0 ([1  ^D] yl) = 1 (3)
Repaying is the best option if UPI > UDI , which implies:
f = u(yh   a D)  u([1  ^D] yl)  ^Dyl +   > 0
The f function measures the relative incentives to repay debt. Repayment occurs if f > 0.
The IMF can a¤ect the decision on default in two ways. First, by reducing the liquidation
costs, the IMF increases the amount of private consumption compatible with debt repayment.
That reduces the marginal utility of private consumption (at the margin) and hence makes
repayment less costly. Second, by lending funds conditional on a value of  that leads to debt
repayment, the IMF can increase the di¤erence between output in case of repayment (yh) and
output in case of default (yl). Crucially, a large value of  makes it possible and optimal for a
country to repay.
Taking derivatives shows that f is increasing in I, a and  , and decreasing in liquidity
needs `1 and `2. So a policy that increases f for given parameters is also a policy that makes
repayment possible for lower default costs, smaller IMF loans, or larger liquidity needs.
The main questions of this paper are about the e¤ects of  on f . Taking the derivative of
f with respect to  and using (3) yields:
@f
@
= u0 (yh   a D) @yh
@
  @yl
@
An increase in  raises the marginal utility in case of repayment (the rst term), but also
increases the marginal utility in case of default: a larger  implies smaller liquidation costs,
which is good for the domestic country. The e¤ect of  on f depends on which term dominates.
Since
@yh
@
= aR(R  1), (4)
@yl
@
= aR2,
we obtain
@f
@
= u0 (yH   a D) aR(R  1)  aR2 (5)
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Since the constraint g  0 binds, u0 (yH   a D) > 1. The expression in (5) thus highlights
a trade-o¤ involved in the choice between conditionalities and immediate liquidity support.
There are two countervailing e¤ects, and the overall impact of  on f is ambiguous.
The rst e¤ect is the disciplining role of conditionalities: conditional lending (low ) spurs
scal adjustment by rewarding a larger  . A lower level of  represents a larger fraction of loans
conditional on scal adjustment, which means relatively more liquidity support for the country
if scal adjustment is undertaken. A reduction in  has a negative impact on the resources lent
to the domestic economy in the rst period regardless of the decision about repayment, but has
a positive impact on second period lending only if the government chooses a value of  that
enables debt repayment.
The countervailing e¤ect is the damage-reducing role of immediate liquidity provision: a
larger  might increase incentives for repayment by reducing the damage caused by a liquidity
crisis. Without IMF support, the output fall could be excessively large, and repayment could
end up requiring very high tax rates, implying very low private consumption and very high
marginal utility. Consequently, debt repayment could become very costly.
Therefore, immediate liquidity provision might provide more incentives for scal adjustment
than conditional lending. This seemingly paradoxical possibility result stems from liquidity pro-
vision having larger e¤ects earlier in the process. If a sudden stop can inict serious damage on
a countrys economy, the resulting output fall might have very negative e¤ects on incentives for
scal adjustment owing to the resulting large drop in private consumption. Clearly, conditional
on repayment being certain, liquidity provision earlier is better than later, as that would bring
a larger reduction on liquidation costs.
One important implication of the model is that:
@2f
@2
= (aR(R  1))2 u00 (yh   a D) < 0
Thus f is concave in . Marginal incentives for scal adjustment and debt repayment are
decreasing in . The intuition is that a little bit of immediate liquidity support might be very
important for preventing severe damages from a sudden stop, but since marginal utility from
consumption is decreasing, the marginal benet or large liquidity support is not so large. On the
other hand, conditional lending always has a positive e¤ect on incentives for scal adjustment
for increasing the di¤erence between yh and yl.
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The e¤ect of other parameters of the model on  can be seen by the respective cross deriv-
atives. For example,
@2f
@@`1
=  u00 (yH   a D) aR3(R  1) > 0
Hence larger liquidity needs, corresponding to a larger value of `1, raise the marginal benet
from increasing . Since @f=@ < 0, that implies that whenever the optimal  is in (0; 1), an
increase in `1 raises . Higher liquidity needs imply larger losses from a liquidity crisis, which
reduce the level of private consistent with debt repayment. It is exactly in those cases that
immediate liquidity support is most useful.
The results in this section are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 E¤ects of the proportion lent in the rst period () on incentives for repayment
(f):
1. The e¤ect of  on f is ambiguous.
2. f is concave in .
3. Higher liquidity needs shift the balance towards a larger .
3.3 Extension: costs of scal adjustment
We now extend the model to capture the idea that a stringent scal adjustment imposes costs
on the economy. These costs might result from the deleterious e¤ects of distortionary taxation,
or from the lack of public investment on infrastructure, or from the political struggle that often
takes place whenever tax increases or spending cuts are planned. For the sake of simplicity,
we suppose that a choice of  = ^D yields no cost to the economy, but output is decreased by
(   ^D)2 whenever  > ^D. This is a simple way to capture the costs of tight scal policy,
and the question is about the e¤ect of the cost of scal adjustment  on .
As before, if the constraint g  0 does not bind, the domestic country nds it optimal to
repay its debt as long as a      D. In this case, conditionalities are unnecessary. We focus
on the case where the constraint g  0 binds.
The expression for utility in case of default is not a¤ected by this modication in the model.
In case of repayment, output is reduced by (   ^D)2, hence the f function is now given by
f = u(yh   a D   (   ^D)2)  u([1  ^D] yl)  ^Dyl +   > 0
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where yh is as before. Thus
@f
@
= u0
 
yh   a D   (   ^D)2
 @yh
@
  2(   ^D)@
@

  @yl
@
(6)
Now a change in  a¤ects the utility in case of repayment in two ways: it direcly a¤ects yh (as
before) but it also a¤ect the cost of scal adjustment, since a larger  reduces the tax required
for debt repayment. Since the constraint g  0 binds, yh = a+D is not a¤ected by , hence
yh
@
@
=   @yh
@
Using that and (4) into (6) yields
@f
@
= u0
 
yh   a D   (   ^D)2

aR(R  1)

1 +

yh
2(   ^D)

  aR2
Hence
@2f
@@
=  u00  yh   a D   (   ^D)2 (   ^D)2aR(R  1) 1 + 
yh
2(   ^D)

(7)
+u0
 
yh   a D   (   ^D)2

aR(R  1) 
yh
2(   ^D)
which is positive for  > ^D. Hence a larger cost of scal adjustment  favours a larger ,
thus it increases the marginal benet of immediate liquidity support. An increase in  raises
yh, which reduces the marginal utility of private consumption in case of repayment, and that is
particularly important when scal adjustment has a strong negative e¤ect on output (i.e., when
 is large). That is the rst term in (7). A larger  also requires a smaller scal adjustment,
and the benet of a smaller tax rise is proportional to . That is the second term in (7). Since
yh is pinned down by the constraint imposed by debt repayment,  does not a¤ect the choice
of  .
Interestingly, a large cost of scal adjustment shifts the balance towards immediate liquidity
support. Common sense might suggest that conditional assistance is needed when tight scal
policy is costly as a way to provide incentives for adjustment, but the rewards from conditional
lending do not increase with a larger . In contrast, marginal utility from consumption is
a¤ected by , and when tight scal policy is more costly, reducing liquidation costs becomes
more important. Immediate liquidity support can reduce the impact of the scal adjustment
on agentsmarginal utility of consumption.
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A large  might also imply that debt repayment is not feasible. An increase in  shifts
down the f function and might make it negative for any value of . In any case, an increase in
conditionalities does not help.
The result of this section is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 A higher cost of scal adjustment () shifts the balance towards a larger pro-
portion of lending in the rst period ().
4 Numerical examples
This section presents numerical examples in order to illustrate the workings of the model.
The numerical examples are not intended to be taken as calibration exercises, the objective
is only to explain the economic intuition behind the results. The numerical examples assume
u(c) = log(c) and abstract from the costs of scal adjustment ( = 0).
Figure 1: Immediate liquidity provision is optimal
Figure 1 compares only the cases  = 0 and  = 1 and shows a case where immediate
liquidity provision is optimal, in the sense that incentives for scal adjustment are larger when
 = 1.10 The bottom curve with stars shows the utility of the country in case of repayment with
10Parameters are: I = 2:88, R = 2, a = 0:08, `1 = 1:4563, `2 = 1:4813 and   = 3.
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no IMF lending and the botton dotted line shows the utility in case of default. Larger debt D
reduces utility in case of repayment, but not in case of default. IMF conditional lending raises
the utility conditional on repayment (the curve with circles) but keeps unchanged utility in
case of default. IMF immediate liquidity support raises utility conditional on repayment even
more (curve with asterisks), because it is more e¤ective in saving liquidation costs. However,
it also raises the utility conditional on defaulting (top horizontal line). So in principle it is not
clear which option provides more incentives for scal adjustment and rebt repayment. In the
example depicted in Figure 1, immediate liquidity provision is the best option.
Figure 2 provides another comparison of the e¤ectiveness of lending with  = 0 and  = 1
with di¤erent parameters.11 In this case, incentives for scal adjustment are larger when  = 0.
Ex-ante IMF lending increases both utility conditional on repayment and utility in case of
default. However, in this case, the e¤ect on utility in case of default (top horizontal line in
Figure 2) more than o¤sets the increase in utility in case of repayment (curve with asterisks). In
terms of welfare, the optimal IMF intervention depends on the level of the debt D: if D is small
enough, then the debtor country has enough incentives to repay debt in any case, so immediate
liquidity support is the best option for it is more e¤ective in reducing output losses. However,
there is a range of values for D in which conditional lending can induce scal adjustment and
debt repayment, but unconditional ex-ante lending cannot.
If the example depicted in Figure 2 is modied so that `1 = 0:997 (instead of 0:9), incentives
for repayment with  = 0 and  = 1 are exactly the same, in the sense that the respective
thresholds for the level of debt D consistent with repayment coincide. Intuitively, larger liq-
uidation costs increase the marginal benet of some immediate liquidity provision, making it
more attractive. Since incentives for scal adjustment and debt repayment are concave in , a
combination of immediate liquidity support and conditional lending in this case increases the
range of values of debt D compatible with debt repayment. So for some values of D, default
is only avoidable if the IMF chooses intermediate values of , thus providing some immediate
liquidity but also lending resources later conditional on scal adjustment.
11Parameters are: I = 3, R = 1:6, a = 0:1, `1 = 0:9, `2 = 1:4 and   = 3.
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Figure 2: Conditional lending provides more incentives for adjustment
5 Discussion
The literature o¤ers several distinct reasons for IMF conditionalities. They can be: (i) a way
for international organizations to impose their will on debtors; (ii) a mechanism through which
countries can signal their type to markets; (iii) a result of the political game; (iv) commitment
devices (See Dreher (2009)). Conditionalities here fall in the fourth category: conditional
lending provides incentives for scal adjustment. In the model, an international lender of last
resort can induce the domestic country to repay its debt by lending resources conditional on
scal adjustment.12
Dreher (2009) argues for the need to rethink structural conditionalities, highlighting the
importance of ex-ante conditionalities. In the model, ex-ante conditionalities are tantamount
to immediate liquidity provision, since in this case there is no delay between a crisis and liquidity
support. Ex-post conditionalities are indeed a poor choice whenever sovereign default is not
an issue and also when liquidation costs lead to large output losses that make repayment very
costly. However, in some cases, conditional lending might be the only way to make sure the
country repays its debts. Nevertheless, the model is consistent with the idea that satisfying the
conditions for immediate liquidity support (call those ex-ante conditionalities) works best for
12See also the discussion in Fisher (2004) and Conway (2006).
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the country in the sense of reducing the costs from a liquidity crisis.
There are many aspects of IMF conditionalities that this paper does not address. First, a
large literature studies the political determinants of IMF conditionalities.13 This paper provides
a normative benchmark that could be extended to include political considerations and other
economic links among countries. Moreover, some critics of conditionality claim it simply does
not work: Bird (2007) points to empirical evidence supporting the view that part of the problem
with conditionality is the inability of countries to implement them properly (see also Easterly
(2005) and Dreher (2009)). This paper has nothing to add to this discussion. Last, part of
the debate surrounding conditionalities relates to policies aiming at fostering growth, which are
also not dealt with in this paper.
This paper has implications for empirical work concerned with the e¤ects of IMF condition-
alities (see Dreher (2009) for a review of this literature and references therein). In particular,
whether conditional lending is the best strategy to deal with a country depends on its eco-
nomic outlook, and there are cases where a mix of immediate liquidity support and ex-post
conditionalities is the only way to provide incentives for scal adjustment and debt repayment.
Moreover, immediate liquidity provision is particularly good when tight scal policy is very
costly.
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